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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Essay in honor of the memory of my dear friend and co-
author, Roger Goebel, presents a cutting-edge issue of 
extraterritoriality. May the law of one jurisdiction, whose competition 
law reaches a set of practices that may be anticompetitive, also reach 
wholly offshore conduct that is part of the same strategy? Does it matter 
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that the conduct is not implemented in the jurisdiction, and its 
prospective territorial effects are derivative from its effects on the 
world market? This question was before the Court of Justice of the 
European Union in the now famous case, Intel Corp. v. Commission 
(“Intel”).1 
The Court in Intel examined two alternative jurisdictional2 bases, 
each reflecting a theory of the case: (1) was the impugned conduct 
implemented in the European Economic Area (“EEA”)?3; and (2) did 
the conduct have qualified effects (foreseeably substantial and 
immediate) in the EEA? Despite the words of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union which presume to apply the qualified effects test, 
I conclude that the Court applied a third test—a “qualified effects 
extension” for ancillary, directly related conduct. Was application of 
the third test appropriate? 
II. THE INTEL CASE 
Intel, an American company, was the dominant supplier of a 
critical chip in laptop computers and notebooks; it held approximately 
seventy percent of the European market in the ten year period during 
which its conduct was examined by the European Commission.4 Its 
only significant competitor was AMD, also an American company. 
AMD finally developed a superior chip, and Intel went into action to 
derail it. Intel implemented two sets of strategies. One was to offer its 
significant customers loyalty rebates that had the effect of exclusivity 
 
1.  Case C-413/14, Intel Corp. v European Comm’n, ECLI:EU:C:2017:632, 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=4BD0BE51134530A8C90EA42
A507D7621?text=&docid=194082&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&
part=1&cid=11710678 [https://perma.cc/W75S-BF77] [hereinafter CJEU judgment]. 
2.  I treat the words “reach-of-the-law” and “jurisdictional” interchangeably, although the 
two concepts can have different procedural consequences. 
3.  The EEA links the European Union with the member states of the European Free Trade 
Area, Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein. It allows these states to participate in the internal 
market on the basis of adopting the law and principles of the internal market.  See European 
Economic Area (EEA), EUROPA (Feb. 5, 2016), https://eeas.europa.eu/diplomatic-network/
european-economic-area-eea/348/european-economic-area-eea_en [https://perma.cc/2YMG-
4S2M]. 
4.  Case T-286/09, Intel Corp. v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2014:547, ¶ 25, 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=153543&pageIndex=0&
doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=11713196 [https://perma.cc/89PS-
56X3], revs’d on other grounds, Case C-413/14 P [2017], http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?text=&docid=198941&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=
first&part=1&cid=11714117 [https://perma.cc/7NN8-J9TB] [hereinafter General Court 
judgment]. 
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with Intel; these were called exclusivity rebates. The other was, as the 
court called them, naked restraints. For Intel’s big customers who had 
already signed on with AMD to buy its new chip, Intel made an offer 
they could not refuse: Breach your contract with AMD and return to 
the Intel fold; Intel will pay you well to do so. Typically, Intel paid its 
unfaithful customers to forsake the AMD chip for six months, a critical 
period for traction for the new product.5 
As for most of the naked restraints and exclusivity rebates that 
constituted the European Commission’s abuse of dominance case 
against Intel, the conduct unarguably had sufficient links to the 
European Union or the EEA and Intel did not contest jurisdiction. But 
the links were more tenuous in the Intel-Lenovo episode. Intel’s 
customer, Lenovo, was a Chinese firm. The chip sales implicated were 
between Intel in Silicon Valley and Lenovo in Beijing. The finished 
products, computers assembled by Lenovo in Beijing, were sold from 
Beijing to the world. The computers implicated (those that would have 
incorporated an AMD chip had Intel not induced the breach of contract) 
were relatively few—a few thousand. They accounted for a small share 
of the world market for the chips, and it was not clear if and how many 
of them reached the EEA. Additionally, Intel and AMD were, of 
course, American firms. Not initially but on its first appeal, Intel 
challenged the European Union’s jurisdiction over the Lenovo episode. 
Did EU law properly reach it? To answer this question, we consider the 
language of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(“TFEU”),6 the requirements of public international law, the EU case 
law, the reasoning of the EU jurists, and policy. 
The first touchstone for considering the reach of EU competition 
law is the Treaty provision concerned. Article 102 of the TFEU 
prohibits the abuse of a dominant position “within the internal market 
or in a substantial portion of it . . . .”7 The second touchstone is public 
international law, which disallows assertion of jurisdiction where it 
would unreasonably interfere with the laws or policy of another 
sovereign state. The occurrence of foreseeably substantial and 
 
5.  See Cyrus Farivar & Andrew Cunningham, The rise and fall of AMD: How an underdog 
stuck it to Intel, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 21, 2013), https://arstechnica.com/information-
technology/2013/04/the-rise-and-fall-of-amd-how-an-underdog-stuck-it-to-intel/ 
[https://perma.cc/KS82-CK6C]; Intel, T-286/09, ¶¶ 129-34, 198-220.   
6.  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 102, 
Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326/47) [hereinafter TFEU]. 
7.  Id. 
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immediate effects in the territory is a recognized basis for jurisdiction.8 
The third is the Court of Justice case law. The principal judgment is A. 
Ahlström Osakeyhtiö v. Commission (“Wood pulp”),9 a case involving 
price-fixing outside of the European Union of goods sold directly to 
EU buyers. The Wood pulp Court interpreted the Treaty to reach the 
offshore price-fixing on grounds that the conspiracy was implemented 
in the European Union. 
Intel argued that the words of Article 102 TFEU10 require that the 
abusive acts take place within the internal market. Intel further argued, 
under Wood pulp, that the Intel-Lenovo acts were not implemented in 
the internal market. Further, it argued that EU law did not have an 
effects test. Finally, it contended that even if the European Union did 
have an effects test, the test was not met because any foreseeable 
European effects of Intel’s dealings with Lenovo were insubstantial 
and not immediate.11 
The Commission found liability at a point in time before Intel 
asserted lack of jurisdiction.12 On Intel’s appeal, in addition to its 
substantive holdings, the General Court found that the jurisdictional 
requirements were met on grounds of both implementation and 
qualified effects. It saw Intel’s conduct as a single and continuous 
infringement. It found that Intel’s conduct had an immediate effect on 
Lenovo’s conduct and was part of an overall strategy with effects on 
the entire world market including the EEA. Again, Intel appealed. 
The Advocate General, Nils Wahl, deemed the General Court’s 
analysis flawed. Contrary to the General Court, Wahl concluded that 
Intel did not implement the Lenovo-related conduct within the internal 
European market.13 The Advocate General urged the Court of Justice 
 
8.  See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, FOURTH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. §§ 
401-13 (AM. LAW INST. 2017). 
9.  Joined Cases C-89/85, C-104/85, C-114/85, C-116/85, C-117/85, C-125/85, C-126/85, 
C-127/85, C-128/85 & C-129/85, A. Ahlström Osakeyhtiö v. Commission of the European 
Communities (“Wood pulp”), 1994 E.C.R. I-00099. The Court observed that the place of 
implementation of the anticompetitive agreement is more important than where an agreement 
was made, lest price-fixers easily evade liability rule. 
10.  “Abuse within the internal market” may be contrasted with the words of Article 101, 
which condemns anticompetitive agreements with the object or effect within the EU or EEA. 
11.  General Court judgment ¶¶ 221-28. 
12.  Id. ¶ 246. 
13.  Case C-413/14 P, Intel Corp. v European Comm’n, ECLI:EU:C:2017:632, ¶¶ 307-14, 
available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=198941&page
Index=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=11714117 [https://perma.cc/
7NN8-J9TB] [hereinafter Advocate General opinion]. 
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to explicitly adopt the qualified effects test,14 but concluded that the 
General Court misapplied the qualified effects test in any event.15 It 
was not enough that Intel’s conduct had a direct and immediate effect 
on Lenovo’s conduct regarding Lenovo’s purchase of chips, nor that 
the Intel-Lenovo episode was part of a general strategy that had 
sufficient effects in the EEA. Rather, the Commission had the 
obligation to prove that Intel’s Lenovo-related conduct had foreseeably 
direct and immediate anticompetitive effects in the internal market. The 
claim that it had such effects appeared “hypothetical, speculative and 
unsubstantiated.”16 But, “it [could not] be ruled out that the Lenovo 
agreements could have had a significant impact on AMD’s continuous 
capacity to develop, manufacture and market computer processing 
units (“CPUs”) worldwide, including in the EEA.”17 “[T]he General 
Court should have asked: could those agreements immediately or 
directly diminish Intel’s competitors’ ability to compete for x86 CPUs 
within the internal market.”18 The General Court made no such analysis 
and this key question, which could have revealed the substantiality and 
immediacy of the effects in the EEA, went unanswered.19 
After the thorough and thoughtful opinion by the Advocate 
General on extraterritorial jurisdiction, the Court of Justice wrote a thin 
judgment on the point.20 The Court summarily rejected as unfounded 
all of Intel’s grounds of appeal in the space of a mere two pages. The 
Court held first (as it backed into an implicit holding that EU law 
accepts the qualified effects test) that the qualified effects test pursues 
the same objective as the implementation test: preventing conduct that 
has anticompetitive effects likely to impact the EU market.21 Implicitly, 
EU competition law must be copious enough to prevent its evasion by 
 
14.  Id. ¶ 296. 
15.  Id. ¶¶ 320-26. 
16.  Id. ¶ 324. 
17.  Id. ¶ 325. 
18.  Id. ¶ 322. 
19.  Advocate General Wahl advocated caution and restraint. He said:  
I consider it to be particularly important that jurisdiction is asserted with restraint in 
relation to behavior that has not, strictly speaking, taken place within the territory of 
the European Union . . . [I]t is only with a great deal of caution that the effect of the 
conduct complained of can be used as the yardstick for asserting jurisdiction. That is 
all the more important today [in a world of more than 100 competition authorities]. 
Id. ¶ 300. 
20.  Admittedly, the Court had to resolve major substantive issues going to the heart of 
Article 102 that may have overwhelmed the jurisdictional point. 
21.  CJEU judgment ¶ 45. 
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firms doing culpable acts offshore. Second, the court held that public 
international law allows jurisdiction “when it is foreseeable that the 
conduct in question will have an immediate and substantial effect in the 
European Union.”22  
Regarding foreseeability of immediate effects, the Court said: 
“[I]t is sufficient to take account of the probable effects of conduct on 
competition in order for the foreseeability criterion to be satisfied.”23 
Further, “Intel’s conduct vis-à-vis Lenovo formed part of an overall 
strategy intended to ensure that no Lenovo notebook equipped with an 
AMD CPU would be available on the market, including in the EEA 
….”24 Thus, “the General Court did not err in considering … that Intel’s  
conduct was capable of producing an immediate effect in the EEA.”25 
As to substantiality, the Court said: “It suffices … that the General 
Court held that Intel’s conduct vis-à-vis Lenovo formed part of an 
overall strategy aimed at foreclosing AMD’s access to the most 
important sales channels .…”26 “[F]aced with [such] … strategy …, it 
was appropriate to take into consideration the conduct of the 
undertaking viewed as a whole in order to assess the substantial nature 
of its effects on the market of the EU and of the EEA.”27 “[T]o do 
otherwise would lead to an artificial fragmentation of comprehensive 
anticompetitive conduct, capable of affecting the market structure 
within the EEA, into a collection of separate forms of conduct which 
might escape the European Union’s jurisdiction.”28 
The brief, uncomplicated Court of Justice judgment contrasts with 
the cautious opinion of the Advocate General. The Advocate General 
presented a challenge. The Intel appeal, he said, “will enable the Court 
to fine-tune [the] line of case-law [on extraterritorial jurisdiction] and 
adjust it to present day conditions, characterized by global economies, 
integrated marketplaces and elaborate patterns of trade.”29 The Court 
side-stepped the challenge. 
 
22.  Id. ¶ 49 (emphasis added). 
23.  Id. ¶ 51. 
24.  Id. ¶ 52. 
25.  Id. 
26.  Id. ¶ 55.  
27.  Id. ¶ 56. 
28.  Id. ¶ 57. 
29.  Advocate General opinion ¶ 280. 
2019] EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION 987 
III. WHO WAS RIGHT? 
1. The Wording of Article 102 
Article 101 prohibits anticompetitive agreements with a distortive 
“object or effect” “within the internal market.”30 Article 102 prohibits 
“an abuse” “within the internal market.”31 Do these phrases and their 
differences mean that the Treaty can catch anticompetitive agreements 
launched offshore (that may have an effect in the internal market) but 
cannot catch abuses of dominance launched offshore because the 
Treaty prohibits abuses only if they are within the internal market? 
Advocate General Wahl properly answered “no,”32 and the Court of 
Justice agreed.33 The difference in the language of the two articles was 
surely fortuitous. The court rightly construed the Treaty language not 
to stand in the way of an appropriate reach of the law to abusive conduct 
from abroad. 
2. Was Intel’s Lenovo-related conduct implemented in the internal 
market? 
The General Court, referencing Lenovo’s acts, said “yes.” 
Advocate General Wahl, referencing Intel’s acts, said “no.” All Intel 
did was shift Lenovo’s future purchases (in China) from American chip 
rival AMD back to itself. Intel did not sell products to Lenovo in the 
EEA. 
The Advocate General is correct. It is a stretch to characterize 
Intel’s conduct in Silicon Valley, and agreements to sell chips from  
Silicon Valley to Beijing to be assembled in computers in China and 
shipped from China to the world, as abusive behavior implemented in 
the EEA. 
But the European Commission and the General Court have 
already stretched the natural meaning of “implementation.” An 
example is the merger of Gencor and Lonrho,34 leading platinum firms 
in South Africa. The merger threatened anticompetitive effects in the 
 
30.  TFEU, supra note 6, art. 101 (emphasis added).  
31.  TFEU, supra note 6 (emphasis added). 
32.  Advocate General opinion ¶¶ 288-89. 
33.  CJEU judgment ¶¶ 42-46. 
34.  Case T-102/96, Gencor Ltd. v Comm’n of the European Communities, 1999 E.C.R. 
II-00753 [hereinafter Gencor/Lonrho]. See ELEANOR M. FOX & DANIEL A. CRANE, GLOBAL 
ISSUES IN ANTITRUST AND COMPETITION LAW 394-97 (West 2d. ed. 2017) [hereinafter FOX & 
CRANE, GLOBAL ISSUES]. 
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world, of which the European Union was the third biggest buying 
market after the United States and Japan.35 The General Court affirmed 
the European Commission’s finding that the merger was implemented 
in the European Union and was covered by the EU Merger Control 
Regulation.36 It was a fact that Lonrho had sales offices in the European 
Union37 (although the harmful effects would have been felt in the 
European Union just as surely if Lonrho had no sales offices there). 
The judgment and its general acceptance in the European Union caused 
observers to conclude (before the Intel case), that for practical purposes 
the European Union had an effects test.38 A version of the effects 
doctrine is widely accepted in the world, and is particularly evident 
with regard to multinational mergers whose effects are felt around the 
world.39 It is considered fair game for any nation within whose borders 
anticompetitive effects of a merger may be felt to examine the merger 
and impose remedies to alleviate the anticompetitive harm in the 
nation.40 
3. Does the European Union Have or Should It Adopt an Effects Test? 
The General Court thought that the European Union already had 
a qualified effects test. The Advocate General observed that the issue 
was unresolved but thought it important for the European Union to have 
an effects test. He invited the court to adopt one and give guidance as 
to its parameters.41 The Court of Justice treated the question as a non-
issue, stating merely that “the qualified effects test pursues the same 
objective [as the implementation test], namely preventing conduct 
which, while not adopted within the EU, has anticompetitive effects 
 
35.  See Gencor/Lonrho ¶ 60. 
36.  Id. ¶¶ 68-69, 87-88. 
37.  Id. ¶ 69. 
38.  See Luca Prete, On Implementation and Effects: The Recent Case-law on the 
Territorial (or Extraterritorial?) Application of EU Competition Rules, 9 J. OF EUR. 
COMPETITION L. & PRAC. 492, 493 (2018). 
39.  See FOX & CRANE, GLOBAL ISSUES, supra note 34, at 1-2, 5, 21-24, 570. 
40.  Typically, one or both merging firms do some significant business in the regulating 
state. A significant stream of revenues into the jurisdiction justifies premerger notification 
requirements and thus premerger vetting with a view towards clearance or remedies. See 
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK, RECOMMENDED PRACTICES FOR MERGER 
NOTIFICATION AND REVIEW PROCEDURES, NEXUS TO REVIEWING JURISDICTION (2018) 
available at https://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/
MWG_NPRecPractices2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/CPK7-ZNYK]. 
41.  See Case C-413/14 P, Intel Corp., supra note 13. 
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liable to have an impact on the EU market.”42 Moreover, the court said, 
the test is “justified under public international law when it is 
foreseeable that the conduct in question will have an immediate and 
substantial effect in the European Union.”43 Thus, it is now clear that 
the European Union has a qualified effects test. 
Of the three sources—the General Court judgment, the Advocate 
General’s opinion, and the Court of Justice judgment—the Advocate 
General’s opinion was the truest to the state of the law on 
implementation and on effects jurisdiction, and the most transparent. 
4. Under the Qualified Effects Test, Does EU Law on Abuse of 
Dominance Reach Intel’s Lenovo-Related Conduct? 
This was the key question. Did or would the United States-to-
China conduct have foreseeably immediate and substantial effects 
within the EEA? 
As we saw, the General Court said “yes.”44 It found the effects 
immediate because no Lenovo notebook incorporating an x86 CPU 
produced by an Intel competitor was available anywhere in the world 
including the EEA. This was foreseeable and intended. Moreover, the 
effects were substantial because the conduct was part of a single and 
continuous infringement, the General Court said, and presumably the 
other parts of the continuous infringement were substantiated.45 
The Advocate General disagreed with the reasoning, as noted. The 
Court of Justice upheld the General Court in broad strokes and simply 
did not engage with Wahl’s analysis. The Court pulled the Lenovo 
episode up by its metaphorical bootstraps, characterizing its European 
effects as substantial merely by bundling the episode with the conduct 
that underpinned the rest of the case. The Court thus maneuvered 
around and assumed away the question of the Lenovo’s episode effects 
in the EEA. 
Which is the better approach? We begin a discussion of this issue 
by asking, first, why we have jurisdictional limits—a question not even 
referenced by the Court of Justice. Second, we ask why we might want 
and to some extent need a significant outreach to condemn 
anticompetitive offshore acts. Third, we ask, is there a reasonable 
 
42.  CJEU judgment ¶ 45. 
43.  Id. ¶ 49. 
44.  General Court judgment ¶ 250 et seq. 
45.  Id. ¶¶ 260-90.   
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reconciliation of the two motivations—the need for limits and the need 
for breadth? 
Why jurisdictional limits? Reading the Court of Justice judgment, 
one might lose sight of the fact that there are jurisdictional limits. The 
reasons are first, that outreach threatens jurisdictional clash, in which 
legitimate interests of one nation clash with legitimate interests of 
another; and second, that outreach threatens to undermine certainty of 
business. 
Let us first consider business certainty. The interest of business to 
avoid overlap of laws is a credible claim but a contingent one. Different 
jurisdictions have different laws and their laws have different nuances. 
This is a fact of life. A world competition regime was proposed in the 
1990s, and before that in the 1940s, but the nations did not adopt such 
an international law of competition and we are left with a multiplicity 
of laws.46 In the absence of an international law of competition, 
business must live with and adjust to diversity. There are on-going 
robust attempts at convergence of national laws among the competition 
authorities of the world, and this project helps to minimize 
differences;47 but it doesn’t eliminate them. 
Second, systems clash, pitting one jurisdiction’s norms against 
another’s. One jurisdiction may invade the interests of another, even if 
it cannot help but do so as it protects its own legitimate interests. 
Antitrust clashes happen less and less frequently as legal principles 
increasingly converge. In some spheres, significant convergence has 
been achieved. Cartel law is first among converged national rules.48 In 
such areas of consensus, we need worry less about systems clash 
caused by enforcement outreach, even while we continue to develop 
 
46.  See ELEANOR M. FOX, ANTITRUST WITHOUT BORDERS: FROM ROOTS TO CODES TO 
NETWORKS (2015), available at http://e15initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/E15-
Competition-Fox-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NVF-RA43].   
47. See INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK, http://www.international
competitionnetwork.org [https://perma.cc/M42E-B447]; see also THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMPETITION NETWORK AT TEN: ORIGINS, ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND ASPIRATIONS (Paul 
Lugard ed. 2011). 
48. Establishment of the strong national rules against cartels has the felicitous by-product 
effect of keeping the global commons free of cartels. See Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 
F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Eleanor M. Fox, Motorola Mobility: How Far Should A 
Nation’s Law Reach, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE 1 (Oct. 2018) [hereinafter Fox, Motorola 
Mobility]; Eleanor M. Fox, China, Export Cartels, and Vitamin C: America Second?, 
COMPETITION POLICY INTERNATIONAL (Mar. 13, 2018) [hereinafter Fox, America Second?]. 
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norms and procedures to avoid conflicting remedies, including double 
counting of damages.49 
But there are also spheres of substantive divergence. Abuse of 
dominance is first among them. One nation’s (view of) abusive conduct 
is sometimes another nation’s (view of) pro-competitive conduct.50 
Conflicting substantive appreciations as to what conduct is 
anticompetitive might counsel sensitivity to outreach of national law in 
this area, which the Intel case potentially inhabits. What EU law calls 
anticompetitive exclusionary conduct US law might call a 
procompetitive response to competition by a rival. US authorities might 
characterize the EU condemnation as chilling the competition of an 
inventive firm and reducing its incentives to invent.51 
But why then might policy (sometimes) call for a wide outreach 
to offshore acts? Increasingly, the conduct that anticompetitively harms 
a nation takes place offshore.52 Sometimes the line from the conduct’s 
launch to the victim’s harm is not perfectly direct, but it is an 
unwavering line nonetheless. The conduct might be a step or two 
removed from the market harm,53 but the arrow is set in motion and 
inexorably will reach its target. Cartels of components in nation A, 
assembled into final products in nation B, that reach foreseeable 
consumers in nation C are a prime example.54 The offending conduct 
is a consensus wrong, and unless the victims or their state call the 
violators to account, the conduct may go unpunished, and the cartels 
will proliferate despite their near universal condemnation.55 Abuses of 
dominance travel across borders, too. A nation beset by antitrust harm 
 
49. See INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK, supra note 47.  
50. See Eleanor M. Fox, Monopolization and Abuse of Dominance: Why Europe Is 
Different, 59 ANTITRUST BULL. 129 (2014) [hereinafter Fox, Why Europe Is Different]. 
Compare Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064 (10th Cir. 2013), with Microsoft Corp. 
v. United States, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). There is a divergence of appreciation of what is 
anticompetitive even in the United States. There is a similar debate in the European Union. 
51. See Fox, Why Europe Is Different, supra note 50. Compare Novell, Inc., 731 F.3d 1064 
with Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 253 F.3d 34. 
52.  See FOX & CRANE, GLOBAL ISSUES, supra note 34, ch. 8 at 527-74. 
53.  Eleanor M. Fox, Extraterritoriality and Input Cartels: Life in the Global Value Lane—
The Collision Course with Empagran and How to Avert It, 9 CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE 1 
(2014) [hereinafter Fox, Extraterrioriality]. 
54.  Id.  
55.  See Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust and the Clash of Sovereigns, in 2 DOUGLAS GINSBURG 
LIBER AMICORUM: AN ANTITRUST PROFESSOR ON THE BENCH (forthcoming 2019); Fox, 
Extraterritoriality, supra note 53. 
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has, in general, the right to apply its usual standards to condemn the 
conduct that is launched abroad.56 
The two options—to condemn, or to keep hands off—cut in 
opposite policy directions. Is there a rule of reconciliation? 
An often applied rule of thumb helps to bring the two motivations 
into sympathy. The offshore conduct must cause or be reasonably likely 
to cause antitrust harm in the enforcing jurisdiction and to do so 
reasonably directly, and remedies should not be disproportionate to the 
territorial harm.57 Proof of this connectivity is not an onerous 
requirement. But the requirement should be taken seriously especially 
in the case of divergent substantive norms. That is why, in applying the 
qualified effects test, Advocate General Wahl was correct. The General 
Court should have asked whether Intel’s Lenovo-relevant conduct was 
likely to “diminish Intel’s [only] competitor’s ability to compete . . . 
within the [European] internal market.”58 
IV. THE THIRD TEST 
The Court of Justice purported to apply the qualified effects test. 
But did it? There seemed to have been no fact-finding to support a 
conclusion that Intel’s agreements with Lenovo had foreseeable 
immediate and substantial effects in the EEA. The hidden holding of 
the case is: where offshore conduct not directly implemented in the 
EEA and potentially, although not immediately,59 affecting the EEA is 
an integral part of a strategy covered by EU law, EU law covers the 
conduct. “[T]o [exclude the conduct] would lead to an artificial 
fragmentation of comprehensive anticompetitive conduct capable of 
affecting the market structure within the EEA, into a collection of 
 
56.  See FOX & CRANE, GLOBAL ISSUES, supra note 34, at 527-74.  
57.  See US DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR 
INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT AND COOPERATION § 3 (2017).  
58.  Advocate General opinion ¶ 322.   
59.  The Court does not concede that the effect may not be immediate. The Court says the 
conduct “was capable of producing an immediate effect in the EEA.” CJEU judgment ¶ 52. If 
“immediate” means “immediate,” the conclusion is doubtful. At least one US court has given 
the US counterpart adjective, “direct,” a pragmatic meaning so that less work is required of 
“directness” where substantial effects are clearly foreseeable. The clause “direct, substantial and 
foreseeable” is given an interdependent and iterative meaning. Minn-Chem, Inc., 683 F.3d at 
845. If the extraterritoriality jurisprudence is to be modernized to fit the globalized world, this 
approach may be necessary. 
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separate forms of conduct which might escape the European Union’s 
jurisdiction.”60 
Is this “qualified effects extension” a wise and appropriate basis 
for laws’ reach? 
There are five reasons to give an affirmative answer, and there are 
five reasons to give a negative answer. First, I state the reasons 
supporting the flexibility. 
First, as background, the conservative inclination (the 
presumption against extraterritoriality) was devised in an era before 
globalization when economic issues were truly a two-sovereign 
“game.” Cross-border transactions were not predominant. Norms in 
favor of more liberal trade as developed in the GATT and WTO were 
only nascent. There was no recognition of mutual as well as global 
gains in both economic welfare and peace by community-minded 
thinking. Moreover, few countries had antitrust laws and fewer had 
competition cultures. We are living in a different era. More than 130 
countries have competition laws, and they have or are developing 
competition cultures, and most recognize the global benefits of 
restraining anticompetitive conduct.61 Strategies enabled by new 
technologies have transnational if not global effects; multinational 
corporations are bigger than nations and can play national regimes off 
against one another; and strategic economic behavior to avoid 
regulation or put costs on foreigners is disfavored in the world trading 
system because it harms people as consumers, firms competing on the 
merits, and global welfare.62 In this altered world marketplace, the 
presumption against extraterritoriality for economic law in defense of 
markets is no longer appropriate.63 We need to deal with the reason 
behind the presumption: to prevent clashes caused by one sovereign’s 
unreasonable intrusion on another sovereign’s legitimate interests, and 
to tailor the law of restraint to the reasons for it. Since general retreat 
and withdrawal from antitrust enforcement against non-nationals and 
foreign-based acts would deeply undermine the global and national 
competition systems, it is fitting to stress modes for accommodation 
more than rules for retreat. 
 
60.  CJEU judgment ¶ 57. 
61.  FOX & CRANE, GLOBAL ISSUES, supra note 34, ch. 8 at 1-2. 
62.  See Fox, America Second?, supra note 48. 
63.  As noted, there is no longer a presumption against national laws’ reaching offshore 
conduct that is directly targeted at, and harms, the enforcing nation. 
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Second, which is a subset of the first, strategies of multinational 
firms are commonly global, and different functions, such as 
manufacturing components, assembling finished products, and 
distributing the finished products, commonly take place in different 
countries. In the absence of an international law of antitrust, unless a 
jurisdiction can examine the full scope of a market problem, 
transactions harmful to the jurisdiction and the world will fall through 
the yawning cracks between our far-from-seamless 130 antitrust laws. 
Third, Intel’s strategy had precisely the characteristics that 
counsel a broader outreach of the law. The market was a world market 
and was highly concentrated, affecting computer users worldwide. The 
strategy was global—to suppress the new invention of the only 
significant competitor/supplier of a critical input into computers. EU 
law clearly applied to core acts comprising the strategy. The conduct 
radiated out from its core to wherever Intel had significant customers 
who would be tempted by rival AMD’s new invention. The Intel-
Lenovo episode was part of the unitary strategy challenged by the 
European Commission, even though its geographic locus was entirely 
offshore and the target market was global, not specifically the European 
Union. As the Court observed, shaving off this episode would 
artificially fragment holistic conduct.64 
Fourth, grappling with the possibility that jurisdiction over the 
episode could interfere with legitimate interests of another sovereign, 
here, the United States, home of Intel,65 we ask two questions: first, 
was there a direct conflict with the law of the United States, in the sense 
of the case Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California (“Hartford Fire”)66? 
That is, was it impossible for Intel to comply with the laws of both 
jurisdictions at the same time? The answer is no. Second, was the EU 
enforcement in tension with US law or policy in a softer sense, as in F. 
Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. (“Empagran”)?67 For 
 
64.  CJEU judgment ¶¶ 50, 56-57. 
65.  What are the legitimate interests of the United States? The United States has a 
legitimate interest in common with the EU: maintaining a competitive market for the good of 
consumers and other market players by proscribing anticompetitive abuses of dominant power. 
Does it have a legitimate interest in protecting its national champion? It is an accepted norm, 
vigorously urged by the United States, that antitrust law does not protect national champions. 
But if EU competition law should be nationalistic and apply its competition law to handicap the 
efficiencies of US firms (which is sometimes charged but adamantly denied), the US would have 
a role in calling out the need to protect efficient competition. 
66.  See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 797 (1993). 
67.  See F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 168 (2004). 
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example, does US antitrust law promote the Intel conduct, deeming it 
a permissible and even virtuous way to compete? The answer is not 
clear. The US FTC consent order against Intel68 supports a negative 
answer, although incumbent-firm-leaning Supreme Court decisions 
would lend support to an affirmative answer: US law may encourage 
what EU law prohibits.69 
Fifth is a proposition rather than a reason: with the other elements 
present, as above,70 the fact of conflicting jurisprudence and debate in 
a defendant’s home country should not defeat outreach by a state 
enforcing its law non-discriminatorily to satisfy an antitrust interest 
likely to affect its territory.71 Reasonable accommodation can be made 
at the remedy stage. 
We turn to five reasons that could lead one to reject the qualified 
effects extension. First, the commonly applied rule of law on 
extraterritoriality requires that the impugned conduct have an 
immediate, substantial, and foreseeable effect in the enforcing 
jurisdiction.72 Second, the test makes good policy sense; namely, to 
minimize conflicts, to avoid encroaching on the interests of other 
sovereigns, to avoid creating uncertainty for business firms and an 
increased risk of conflicting rules, and to further good administration. 
Good administration would entail avoiding control over conduct in 
 
68.  See Matter of Intel Corporation, F.T.C. Docket No. 9341 (Nov. 2, 2010) (consent 
order), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2010/08/100804inteldo_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NP8X-P4MS]. 
69.  See Verizon Commc’n, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004); 
Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. LinkLine Commc’n, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009). For a circuit court opinion 
written by now Supreme Court Justice Gorsuch, see Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 
1064 (10th Cir. 2013). 
70.  This would be especially true where the home country did not complain about the 
exercise of jurisdiction. Compare Gencor/Lonrho, where South Africa expressed its view that 
the merger of the two South African firms was not anticompetitive and that the merger was good 
for South Africa, but it did not complain about the EU prohibition. See FOX & CRANE, GLOBAL 
ISSUES, supra note 34, at 394-97. In Wood pulp, the United States not only did not complain 
about the European Union’s suit against an American export cartel authorized under the Webb 
Pomerene Act but in effect told the European officials: if this is a cartel into your jurisdiction, 
prosecute it. See Wood pulp, supra note 9. 
71. Similar debate exists on the same point of law within the EU. Moreover, the 
Commission’s decision is appealable through the European system. Indeed, in Intel itself, the 
Court of Justice reversed and remanded the judgment of the General Court that upheld the 
decision of the Commission. See CJEU judgment ¶ 148. 
72.  See US DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 57. 
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which the regulating nation has no interest.73 Third, international law 
requires no less. The territorial test with its limited extraterritorial reach 
stabilizes the international order. For all that may be said and desired 
about a cosmopolitan vision of world community, it is not the law. It 
has not been bargained for by the nations and is not the customary law 
of nations.74 Indeed, the current modus operandi, for better or worse, is 
nationalistic, not cosmopolitan. 
Fourth, the state of globalization in the world and the constant 
emergence of new technologies that cross borders are reasons for, not 
against, limits to national law. Firms constrained by a hundred 
sovereigns cannot be as inventive as firms with one governmental 
master. With an increasing application of nations’ antitrust laws to 
successful global firms, innovation will decline and consumers and the 
world will be worse off.75 
Fifth, Intel’s challenged conduct is precisely in the area of the 
greatest divergence of substantive antitrust law; namely, when are 
single-firm strategies of dominant firms anticompetitive? US and EU 
law conflict.76 Especially in this area, it may be argued, jurisdictions 
should not extend the reach of their laws; they should stay within their 
bounds. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The two sets of arguments77 are based on different world views of 
community, political economy, power, and the purview of the state 
versus the purview of the market. This writer is persuaded by the first 
set.78 This is so largely because the strategies referenced are global and 
 
73.  See Advocate General opinion ¶ 298-302; Luca Prete, On Implementation and Effects: 
The Recent Case-law on the Territorial (or Extraterritorial?) Application of EU Competition 
Rules, 9 J. OF EUR. COMPETITION L. & PRAC. 492, 493 (2018). 
74. “Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of states 
followed out of a sense of legal right or obligation.” RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 8, § 402, cmt. b.    
75. This was one of defendant’s arguments in Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics 
Corp., 775 F.3d 816 (7th Cir.). But see Fox, Motorola Mobility, supra note 48. 
76.  See Fox, Why Europe is Different, supra note 50.  
77.  There are middle grounds. Analysts or policy-makers might accept some but not all of 
the reasons and propositions on either side. 
78.  The question of the third way need not even have been reached if the General Court 
had asked the Advocate General’s question and answered it in the affirmative: “[C]ould [the 
Intel-Lenovo] agreements immediately or directly diminish Intel’s competitors’ ability to 
compete for x86 CPUs chips within the internal market”; could they have had a significant 
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the constituent pieces are synergistic. Moreover, a principle of 
jurisdictional retreat would defang national laws in their mission to 
control abuses of market power that would sanction harm to every 




impact on AMD’s continuous capacity to develop, manufacture and market CPUs worldwide 
including the EEA? 
998 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42:3 
 
